protocol that allows a user to privately retrieve from a database an entry with as small as possible communication complexity. We call a PIR protocol non-trivial if its total communication is strictly less than the size of the database. Non-trivial PIR is an important cryptographic primitive with many applications. Thus, understanding which assumptions are necessary for implementing such a primitive is an important task, although (so far) not a well-understood one. In this paper we show that any non-trivial PIR implies Oblivious Transfer, a far better understood primitive. Our result not only signi cantly clari es our understanding of any non-trivial PIR protocol, but also yields the following consequences:
Introduction
Relationships between cryptographic primitives. One of the central questions in cryptography is to study which assumptions (if any) are necessary to implement a cryptographic protocol or task. For most primitives this answer is well understood, and falls in two categories: either one-way functions are necessary and su cient, or stronger assumptions are necessary (i.e., oneway functions with some additional properties like trapdoor may be required). For example, pseudo-random generators 20], signature schemes 32, 36] , commitment schemes 20, 30] and zero-knowledge proofs for NP 20, 30, 18, 34] are all equivalent to the existence of a one-way function. On the other hand there is a class of primitives that probably needs additional assumptions, including, for example, public-key cryptosystems, key-exchange, oblivious transfer 22], noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for NP 11] and any non-trivial secure two-party 4] and multi-party function evaluation 25]. Single Database Private Information Retrieval has received a lot of attention in the literature, however its place in the above setting was not understood. In this paper we address (and resolve) its position.
? n and does not require condition (b) { which is essential for the de nition of Oblivious Transfer. The ? n 1 -OT protocol that combines both requirements (a), (b) and the small communication requirement was considered in 16] , who call it Symmetric-PIR.
In 24], it was shown that OT is complete, namely it can be used to construct any other protocol problem. 21] have shown that OT implies the existence of one-way functions. Moreover, 22] have shown that assuming OT is probably stronger than assuming existence of one-way functions (OWF) in the following sense. They show that it is impossible to construct a black-box reduction from OT to OWF (where the OT protocol uses the promised OWF as a black box, and the proof is black-box). Furthermore, proving any such black-box construction (even if the proof itself is not black-box), is as hard as separating P from NP. Thus 22] gives a strong evidence that OWF are currently not su cient to construct OT, namely that OT is a strictly stronger assumption.
Our Results
In this paper, we present a reduction transforming any nontrivial single-database PIR into Oblivious Transfer. The signi cance of this reduction is threefold: (1) it provides \negative" results, asserting that PIR cannot be constructed based on weak computational assumptions; ( 2) It provides a general \positive" result, namely that PIR is also a complete primitive,and any non-trivial implementation of Single-Database PIR may be used to construct any other secure protocol; and (3) it provides a speci c \positive" result, allowing transformation from communication e cient single-database PIR to communication-e cient that we can also reduce any code for non-trivial single-database PIR to a code for OT; this is similar to code-to-code reductions in 4]. Moreover, our theorem holds even if the communication sent by the user in the given PIR scheme is unbounded, as long as the database sends less than n bits.
OT protocol implies the existence of a one-way function 21]. Single database PIR also implies the existence of a one-way function 3], but in light of 22] our result is strictly stronger and implies the following:
Corollary (Informal Statement) One-way functions are necessary but probably not su cient to construct non-trivial Single-Database PIR.
Completeness of Any non-trivial Single-Database PIR. The following corollary, demonstrating the importance of the PIR primitive, follows from the result of the completeness of OT 24]:
Corollary (Informal Statement) Any non-trivial Single-Database PIR is complete for all two-party and multi-party secure computation.
That is, an implementation of the PIR primitives allows a secure computation of any function.
Symmetric-PIR (or communication-efficient
? n 1 -OT ). In the standard formulation of PIR, there is no concern about how many bits of the database the user learns. If one makes an additional requirement that the user must learn only one bit (or secret) of the database, then this can be viewed as communicatione cient ? n 1 -OT (called Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)). SPIR schemes were rst introduced in 16] in the setting of multiple databases. In 27] SPIR were shown to exist in the setting of a single database. The singledatabase SPIR schemes of 27, 16, 37] were based on speci c algebraic assumptions. Naor and Pinkas 31] have shown a general reduction transforming any single database PIR into single-database SPIR using one call to the underlying PIR protocol, a logarithmic number of calls to one-out-of-two (string) Oblivious Transfer, and the existence of pseudo-random generators. Combining our main result with that of 31] we get: Theorem (Informal Statement) If there exists any non-trivial SingleDatabase PIR scheme with communication c(n) and security parameter k, then there exists ? n 1 -OT (i.e., SPIR) with communication c(n) poly(k). We stress that the e cient communication complexity of the SPIR scheme we construct is the main point of the last theorem. Indeed, in the context of computational assumptions, SPIR is equivalent to the ? n 1 -OT variant of Oblivious Transfer. However, this theorem provides a stronger result, since the communication complexity obtained (which is the main parameter in the SPIR context) is e cient, costing only a factor depending on the security parameter (not on n) over the underlying PIR. In particular, when given PIR scheme with a sublinear communication, the resulting SPIR scheme also has sublinear communication. In this section we give some general conventions that we will use in the paper and the formal de nitions for PIR, SPIR, and OT. General Conventions Let N I be the set of natural numbers and de ne k] = f1; : : :; kg. If S is a set, the notation x S denotes the random process of selecting element x from set S with uniform probability distribution over S and independently from all other random choices. If A is an algorithm, the notation y A(x) denotes the random process of obtaining y when running algorithm A on input x, where the probability space is given by uniformly and independently choosing the random coins (if any) of algorithm A. By Prob R 1 ; : : :; R n : E ] we denote the probability of event E, after the execution of random processes is such a transcript, the output of A (resp. B) on this execution is denoted by A(x; r A ; t) (resp. B(y; r B ; t)). The notation (r B ; t) t A;B (x; r A ; y; ) denotes the random process of selecting a random string r B uniformly at random (and independently of all other choices), and setting t = t A;B (x; r A ; y; r B ). Similarly we denote (r A ; t) t A;B (x; ; y; r B ) for the case where A's random string is chosen uniformly at random, and (r A ; r B ; t) t A;B (x; ; y; ) for the case where the random strings for both A and B are chosen uniformly at random. Private Information Retrieval. Informally, a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme is an interactive protocol between two parties, a database D and a user U. The database holds a data string x 2 f0; 1g n , and the user holds an index i 2 n]. In its one-round version, the protocol consists of (a) a query sent from the user to the database (generated by an e cient randomized query algorithm, taking as an input the index i and a random string r U ); (b) an answer sent by the database (generated by an e cient deterministic (without loss of generality) answer algorithm, taking as an input the query sent by the user and the database x); and (c) an e cient reconstruction function applied by the user (taking as an input the index i, the random string r U , and the answer sent by the database). At the end of the execution of the protocol, the following two properties must hold: (1) after applying the reconstruction function, the user obtains the i-th data bit x i ; and (2) the distributions on the query sent to the database are computationally indistinguishable for any two indices i; i 0 . (That is, a computationally bounded database does not receive any information about the index of the user). We now give a formal de nition of a PIR scheme.
De nition 1. (Private Information Retrieval Scheme.) Let (D; U) be an interactive protocol, and let R be a polynomial time algorithm 2 . We say that (D; U; R) is a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme if:
1. (Correctness.) For each n 2 N I , each i 2 f1; : : :; ng, each x 2 f0; 1g n , where
x n , and x l 2 f0; 1g for l = 1; : : :; n, and for all constants c, and all su ciently large k, Prob (rD; rU; t) tD;U( (1 k ; x); ; (1 k ; n; i); ) : R(1 k ; n; i; rU; t) = We say that (D; U; R) is an honest-database PIR scheme if it is a PIR scheme in which the user-privacy requirement is relaxed to hold only for D 0 that follow the protocol execution as D.
For sake of generality, the above de nition does not pose any restriction on the number of rounds of protocol (D; U); however, we remark that the most studied case in the literature is that of one-round protocols (as discussed above). Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval. Informally, a symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) scheme is a PIR scheme satisfying an additional privacy property: data privacy. Namely, for each execution, there exists an index i, such that the distributions on the user's view are computationally indistinguishable for any two databases x; y such that x i = y i . (That is, a computationally bounded user does not receive information about more than a single bit of the data). We now give a formal de nition of a SPIR scheme.
De nition 2. (Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval Scheme) Let (D; U; R) be a PIR scheme. We say that (D; U; R) is a symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) scheme if in addition it holds that 3. (Data Privacy.) For each n 2 N I , for each polynomial time U 0 , each i 0 2 f1; : : :; ng, and each random string r U 0 , there exists an i 2 f1; : : :; ng, such that for each x; y 2 f0; 1g n where x = x 1 x n and y = y 1 y n , x l ; y l 2 f0; 1g for l = 1; : : :; n, and such that x i = y i , for all constants c and all su ciently large k, it holds that jp x ? p y j k ?c , where p x = Prob (r D ; t) t D;U 0 ((1 k ; x); ; (1 k ; n; i 0 ); r U 0 ) : U 0 (1 k ; n; i 0 ; r U 0 ; t) = 1 ] p y = Prob (r D ; t) t D;U 0 ((1 k ; y); ; (1 k ; n; i 0 ); r U 0 ) : U 0 (1 k ; n; i 0 ; r U 0 ; t) = 1 ]:
2 For clarity, we chose to include the reconstruction function R as an explicit part of the PIR de nition. We note however that replacing R by U in the correctness requirement yields an equivalent de nition (where the reconstruction function is an implicit part of U, who executes it to produce an output).
Oblivious Transfer. Informally, a 1 -OT protocol where privacy requirements are relaxed to hold only when both Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious; that is, (Alice; Bob) should satisfy correctness, privacy against honest-but-curious Bob (as de ned above), and privacy against honest-but-curious Alice (which is similarly de ned). We remark that the de nitions of ? n 1 -OT. It can be easily veri ed that ? n 1 -OT is equivalent to SPIR with a database of length n. The reason we need two concepts (and the reason we formulated the de nitions in two di erent, though equivalent, ways), is the di erent motivations for using these primitives (and the way they were historically de ned). In particular, we note that when constructing a SPIR protocol, the communication complexity is a crucial parameter.
3 PIR Implies honest-Bob- 1 -OT protocol consists of simultaneously invoking polynomially many 4 independent executions of P with a random data string for D (ran by Alice) and random indices for U (ran by Bob). In addition, Bob sends to Alice two sequences of indices (one consists of the indices retrieved in the PIR invocations, and one a sequence of random indices), and in response Alice sends to Bob her two secret bits appropriately masked, so that Bob can reconstruct only one of them. A formal description of protocol (Alice; Bob) is in Figure 1 . We note that some related techniques to those in our construction have appeared in 5]; however, we remark that the protocol of 5] cannot be used in our case, mainly because of the di erences in the models. We next prove that (Alice; Bob) is a honest-Bob-? 2 1 -OT protocol. Correctness. In order to prove the correctness of (Alice; Bob), we need to show that Bob outputs b c with probability at least 1 ? k ?! (1) . First, notice that if Bob is able to correctly reconstruct all bits x j (i j ) for j = 1; : : :; m, after the m executions of the PIR protocol in step 1, then he is able to compute the right value for b c in step 5. Next, from the correctness of P = (D; U; R), Bob, who is playing as U, is able to reconstruct all bits x j (i j ) with probability at least (1 ? k ?!(1) ) m since the m executions of (D; U) are all independent. This probability is then at least 1 ? k ?!(1) since m is polynomial in k.
Privacy against Alice. In order to prove that (Alice; Bob) satis es the property of privacy against Alice, we need to show that for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Alice 0 , the probability that Alice 0 , at the end of the protocol, is able to compute the bit c input to Bob is at most 1=2 + k ?!(1) (where probability is taken over the uniform distribution of c and the random strings of Alice 0 and Bob). Informally, this follows from the user's privacy in the PIR subprotocol P, which guarantees that in each invocation Alice gets no information about the index used by Bob, and thus cannot tell between the sequence of real indices used, and the sequence of random indices (since both these sequences are distributed uniformly). A more formal argument follows. Assume for the sake of Honest-Bob- contradiction that the property is not true; namely, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Alice 0 , which, after running protocol (Alice 0 ; Bob), is able to compute c with probability at least 1=2 + k ?d , for some constant d and in nitely many k. In step 3, Bob sends two m-tuples (I 0 ; I 1 ) of indices to Alice 0 , such that I c is the tuple of indices used by Bob in the PIR invocations of step 1, and I c is a tuple containing random indices. Therefore, Alice 0 is able to guess with probability at least 1=2 + k ?d which one of I 0 ; I 1 is the tuple of retrieved indices. This implies, by a hybrid argument, that for some position j 2 f1; : : :; mg, Alice 0 can guess with probability at least 1=2 + k ?d =m whether in the j-th PIR invocation the index used was i j 0 or i j 1 . Since all PIR invocations are independent (implying that the indices in di erent positions within I 0 and I 1 are independent), it is straightforward to use Alice 0 to construct a D 0 which distinguishes in a single PIR execution between the index used by the user and a random index, with probability at least 1=2 + k ?d =m. Since m is polynomial, this is a non-negligible advantage, and thus contradicts the user privacy of P.
Privacy against honest-but-curious Bob. In order to prove that the pair (Alice; Bob) satis es the property of privacy against a honest-but-curious Bob, we need to show that the probability that Bob, after behaving honestly in the protocol, is able to compute the bit b c is at most 1=2+k ?!(1) (where probability is taken over the uniform distribution of b 0 ; b 1 , and the random strings of Alice and Bob). In order to prove this property for an appropriate polynomial number m of invocations of (D; U) in step 1, we start by considering a single invocation. In the following lemma we consider the probability p that a malicious user U 0 , after invoking (D; U 0 ) where D uses a uniformly chosen database, fails in reconstructing a bit in a random location j in the database. Note that j is not known to U 0 when running (D; U 0 ). 5 We also note that no further requirements about U 0 or its computational power are necessary. In the following we show that if the database communication complexity is less than the length of the data, this failure probability is non-negligible. This is shown by rst bounding the binary entropy of the failure probability. 1 ? p) ). Proof. We need to prove that, for every U 0 and R 0 , after running (D; U 0 ) with a uniform data string for D, the probability that R 0 fails in reconstructing a data bit in a uniformly chosen location j, has binary entropy which is bounded below by k?cD(k) k . This is proved using standard information theory arguments (e.g., similar arguments have been used in 3]). For background and terminology used in the proof below, see for example 9].
Let X be the random variable ranging over the data strings (where X j corresponds to the j-th bit), and A be the random variable ranging over the database answers. Thus, the length of A is at most c D ( The relation between the failure probability p and its binary entropy is given by the following fact (the proof follows from the expression for the entropy function and is omitted). The above fact allows us to translate the lower bound on H(p) into a lower bound on p. For example, a loose manipulation of the fact yields that, for any > 0 and small enough p, p > H(p) 1+ . More generally, if H(p) is non-negligible then p is also non-negligible. For sake of concreteness, we state a corollary bounding the failure probability, using = 1. This will be su cient for our needs, although as explained tighter corollaries can be derived. x m (i m c ), since he receives z c from Alice in step 4. This, together with Corollary 1, yields that for an appropriately chosen polynomial number m, the failure probability is exponentially close to 1, namely Bob's probability of correctly reconstructing b c is negligible. We conclude that our protocol maintains privacy against honest-but-curious Bob.
We have proved that the protocol of Figure 1 maintains correctness, privacy against Alice, and privacy against honest-but-curious Bob. We have therefore proved the following theorem. Similarly, it is easy to see that using a PIR scheme for which the data privacy requirement holds with respect to honest databases (rather than maliciously ones) in the protocol of Figure 1 OT requires the same number of rounds as the underlying PIR protocol P, and in particular if P has one round, so is the new protocol. This is so, since all the messages that need to be sent by Bob (in steps 1,3 of our protocol) can be computed in parallel and sent to Alice in a single message, and similarly all messages that need to be sent back by Alice (in steps 1,4) can be sent to Bob in a single message. We also note that our theorem holds even when we consider expected communication complexity (rather than maximal).
Computational Power of the Parties. Our transformation from PIR to honest-Bob-? 2 1 -OT preserves the computational power of the parties; namely, if D (resp., U) runs in polynomial time, then so does Alice (resp., Bob). In terms of privacy, our result is stronger than stated in Theorem 1; namely, the privacy against the honest-but-curious Bob is information-theoretic (to see this, observe that in the proof of this property we never make any assumption on the computational power of Bob, but rather rely on Lemma 1 which is information-theoretic). On the other hand, the privacy against Alice requires the same assumptions as on the computational power of D in the PIR protocol (D; U); however, notice that Alice must be computationally bounded, since there exists no single database PIR protocol with communication complexity smaller than the size of the database and private against a computationally unbounded database 8].
Our Reduction. We note that our construction is a black-box reduction in the following sense: the ? 2 1 -OT uses the underlying PIR protocol as a subroutine with the only guarantee that the total number of bits that user gets regarding the database is strictly less then the total size of the database (i.e., without relying on any speci c features of the implementation, and without making any additional assumptions about the implementation.) Thus any idealized implementation of this primitive (as a black-box) will also work for our purposes. As a consequence, our reduction is also \code-to-code". That is, any implementation of non-trivial Single-Database PIR protocol will also give an implementation of OT. In this aspect, our reduction is similar to 4]. 1 -OT , and additional communication complexity c(n poly(k)) where n is the length of the data string and k is the security parameter. Next, since PIR implies one-way functions ( rst proved in 3] and also directly follows from the results in the previous section), PIR also implies pseudo-random functions 17, 20] . Finally, by our result in the previous section, PIR implies ? 2 1 -OT (where the communication complexity is some polynomial poly 0 in the security parameter). Thus, we get that PIR implies SPIR with communication complexity c 0 (n), satisfying c 0 (n) = c(n poly(k)) + poly 0 (k) logn = poly 00 (k) c(n), where poly; poly 0 ; poly 00 are polynomials, k is a security parameter, and n is the length of the database. The second equality uses the fact that c(n) > log n, which follows from a result proven in 3], namely that in PIR where the database sends less than n bits, the user must send at least logn bits of communication.
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